any, are embodied in the legal practices we are presently engaged in." 6 Second, natural lawyers may answer: Because " [t] he backbone of tort is a set of moral-natural lawprinciples identifying as wrongful all choices precisely to harm or to deceive." 7 That assertion may be somewhat overdrawn. The moral "backbone" for any particular scheme of tort law is not automatically "natural" simply because legal decision makers who apply it believe that it is. Nevertheless, it confirms natural law that decision makers assume that particular judgments they make must fit intelligibly onto to some backbone. So too that decision makers take such backbones for granted while settling particular disputes.
My last possible answer is a pragmatic conceptualist one: 8 "It's the worst system available except for all the others." A wrong-based approach trades on people's selfishness.
Citizens may reliably be expected to assert their claimed rights to their fullest-and to accuse anyone who stands in the way of committing a wrong. In addition, civil judicial proceedings are the likeliest venues for clarifying the scope of rights-and they are almost certain to be more efficient if they are focused on the wrongs. Criminal law can and sometimes does declare property rights. 9 But substantively, criminal law focuses more 6 Coleman, The Practice of Principle, 5. . 9 See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979) (holding that recreational boaters are not entitled to boat on rivers not navigable under traditional tests of navigability without the consent of the owners of the beds beneath the rivers); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 370 (N.J. 1971) (holding that a land owner's possessory interest in control does not entitle him to exclude government caseworkers or publicly-funded legal advocates from meeting migrant farmworkers residing on his land). often on punishing clear aggression than it does on determining the precise limits on rights allegedly aggressed-on. And institutionally, criminal lawsuits are initiated and resolved by public prosecutors, not owners. The latter have strong incentives to clarify the scope of their property rights in litigation; the former hardly ever do. Property rights could also be declared in in rem actions-as claims to title are in quiet-title proceedings. But it is far easier, less tedious, and less threatening to non-parties' due process interests for a court to pronounce that D is more culpable than P than it is for the court to enumerate all of P's rights in relation to his res and everyone else in the world. 10 Yet even if the tort system generally avoids making sweeping pronouncements about property rights, it does operate as if such pronouncements exist. I hope to demonstrate as much by showing how trespass to land and four other salient doctrines implement a single property-related political morality. I cover here: one paradigm "property" tort (trespass to land); one "tort" defense to trespass (necessity); another "property" defense to trespass (adverse possession); the tort that gets pride of place among torts (negligence); and one orphan action usually overlooked in both property and tort (trespass to chattels).
I. PROPERTY IN A LOCKEAN THEORY OF LABOR
Throughout most of this Chapter, I will interpret the tort doctrines I have selected assuming that a labor-based morality justifies the property rights being secured by trespass and the other doctrines selected. Readers need not find labor-based morality normatively persuasive to follow my conceptual use of it here. Although such a morality is not in vogue today, many if not most of the seminal English and American trespass, nuisance, and other related cases relied on some such morality. 11 Conceptual interplays are easier to follow when the cases rely on a single political morality than when (as in current tort law) different cases and scholarship embrace different foundations. In addition, labor-based morality generates prescriptions about property that are relatively hard-edged. These hard-edged rules may be and have been applied consistently across a wide range of property torts. The simpler the substantive prescriptions, the easier it is to track interplays between substantive right and tort structure. 12 Let me supply an extremely compressed restatement of a common-denominator, labor-based justification for property rights. 13 In this justification, legal property rights are justified by their tendencies to secure to members of the political community their natural rights to labor. Here, "natural rights" must be understood against the backdrop of an egoistic morality. In principle, this morality is grounded in human flourishing. In practice, however, this morality encourages legal decision makers to focus on the lowest and most urgent aspects of flourishing. Government actors are competent enough to determine 11 See Thomas 12 I suspect that many different respectable political moralities justify the main features of both trespass torts and the necessity privilege along similar and overlapping grounds. I also suspect that there is more disagreement (and less overdetermination) about adverse possession and the duties of land owners to nonowners in negligence. I allude to some of these complications in discussing negligence in section VII.C, below, but for the most part I avoid them for ease of exposition. 13 The following restatement compresses and adapts to relevant context Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase, 1398-1404; Eric R. Claeys, "Productive Use in Acquisition, Accession, and Labor Theory," in James E. Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066166, 8-24.
whether particular actions contribute to their or others' "Subsistence and Comfort," 14 but they are usually incompetent to settle citizens' disputes about different comforts. 15 By focusing on a natural right to labor, this morality declares that tort law and other conventional rules are judged by how well they secure nonconventional moral interests to those interests' claimants. By describing those interests in terms of the rights, the morality encourages claimants to protect their own interests by asserting them spiritedly.
In this context, "labor" refers to planned activity, intended and reasonably likely to generate for the laborer subsistence or improvement. (Henceforth, I will refer to such goods as "self-preservation and -improvement" when context requires distinction, and "prosperity" or "benefit" when it does not.) In relation to an external resource, the right to labor on the resource means the right to "use" the resource "beneficially" or "productively." 16 Property rights are justified because they give proprietors the priority and security they need to labor to further their plans for using resources beneficially.
Labor theory imposes four separate correlative constraints on the nonconventional right to claim property for labor. To enjoy a labor-based claim over a resource, a laborer must actually "make use of" it "to any advantage of life before it spoils." 17 (I call this requirement the responsibility not to waste.) The laborer must also mark the resources he appropriates so others know not to appropriate them, by "put[ting] a distinction between them and common." 18 (I call this requirement "claim-marking.") A laborer must defer to others' interests in acquiring and consuming resources "as will keep [them] from extream want, where [they have] no means to subsist otherwise." 19 (This requirement, which I call here the "necessity" 20 proviso, confirms how labor theory prioritizes self-preservation over self-improvement in its many forms.) Last, because every citizen's right to labor is equal to every other's, the "sufficiency limitation" requires each citizen to leave others enough and as good opportunities to appropriate and use resources for their own prosperities. 21 These non-conventional foundations justify any conventional system that seems practically likely to enlarge citizens' opportunities to labor beyond the opportunities they would have in an unorganized community. Here, Locke and seminal Anglo-American jurists largely agreed on a practical and rough empirical judgment: The best way to encourage concurrent labor in relation to land is to endow proprietors of land with broad rights of exclusive control, possession, and managerial discretion over the future uses of their lots. (I will refer to this collection of rights here as "control rights.") Such control rights free proprietors to make long-term investments into, and farreaching transformations of, their lots. So transformed and managed, land can generate on the order of 100 times more life benefits than it could when used temporarily by 18 do not possess land themselves may acquire the goods they could have appropriated from land by working, or by producing goods with other resources, and then trading pay or their own products for produce from land. Although such control rights do entitle proprietors to deny others' claims to use owned resources, that control is the price to be paid to secure to proprietors the practical discretion they need in order to produce. The control also embodies labor theory's preference not to rate directly against one another competing claims by different claimants to use a single asset for different life-improving goals.
Even if broad control rights are justified indirectly by use-or labor-based foundations, however, in principle the justification is too indirect unless the rights seem practically likely to implement the foundational rights. This connection breaks down if a non-proprietor has a genuine claim based on the necessity proviso. It also breaks down when if a particular proprietor violates the nonwaste responsibility-e.g., if he lets "the Unclearly-marked rights may provoke unnecessary disputes between proprietors and other claimants on land, and they may frustrate beneficial commerce.
Next, positive law may justifiably qualify legal control when doing so seems practically likely to enlarge the likely uses most proprietors will make of their lots. Because control rights are indirect means to encourage productive labor on land, they may be qualified when doing so seems practically likely to enlarge citizens' underlying interests in laboring. If a city requires all home owners to lay sidewalks according to specifications it sets, it limits those owners' uses of the ground beneath the sidewalks, but it also expands their liberties of action by enlarging their capacities to travel. 24 Last, labor-based morality requires legal decision makers to use prudence and consequentialist reasoning. Although principles like "control rights," "waste," "sufficiency," "necessity," and "clear marking" all have some content, it takes practical judgment to determine which apply in a particular repeat act-situation. If several apply, it takes further judgment to prioritize them rightly in relation to one another. In many situations, these principles may not require any single one rule. Positive law may need to implement one of several plausible choices much as a general norm protecting personal safety requires legislators to choose a speed limit. Legal decision makers must identify the "established laws of liberty" most likely "to secure protection and incouragement to the honest industry of Mankind," 25 but that prescription requires them to exercise practical judgment.
II. THE UNCONSENTED-ENTRY PARADIGM
Although principles of natural rights and labor make prescriptions about land possession's general character, they make no corresponding prescriptions about what specific doctrines will help embody that character. Tort is one of several fields helping to specify property rights. Tort hones in the proper content of such rights by a series of approximations. I will classify such approximations as consisting of five separate strategies.
The first strategy is quite general: to identify a paradigm for the control rights proprietors deserve to enjoy over land. In trespass and other related land-use tort doctrines, that paradigm is supplied by the unconsented-entry test. Blackstone explained how this test implements labor-based moral interests. Once the right of meum and tuum, or property, in lands [is] established, it follows as a necessary consequence, that this right must be exclusive; that is, that the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his soil: every entry therefore thereon without the owner's leave, and especially if contrary to his express order, is a trespass or transgression. 26 The individual natural right to "use" land (i.e., to use it to benefit human life) supplies a moral foundation for property in land. Given land's use potential, however, land owners 27 deserve substantive interests not only in their use of land but also in their "occupation" of it. That "occupation" means control rights-as Blackstone confirms by assuming that "occupation" must be "exclusive" and "sole."
The unconsented-entry paradigm and Blackstone's account of it provide extremely concrete and powerful illustrations of the relation between rights and corrective structure in tort. To begin with: Tort is structured assuming that there exist substantive moral rights logically prior to tort law, and that these rights "seem to merge entitlements to do, have, omit or be something with claims against others to act or refrain from acting in certain ways." 28 Blackstone's account of the control owners deserve in land confirms as much. 26 Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:*209. 27 Blackstone refers to "owners" here, and I will in the remainder of this easy for ease of exposition. That said, many of the land-use torts protect not only absolute owners but also tenants and other proprietors with present possession. 28 32 Coleman, "Epilogue," 12.
thing," and to eliminate the relation "between the owner and other individuals in reference to things." 33 True, some passages of Blackstone-especially his description of property as "sole and despotic dominion"-give color to this perception. 34 Both conceptually and normatively, however, any one owner's property in land is part of a package deal.
Normatively, if labor-based morality is reasonably persuasive, it is just to force individuals to refrain from asserting their sufficiency-based claims on one person's land if they are given ample opportunities to labor for their own prosperities on other tangible resources.
So property scholars and tort conceptualists make a conceptual mistake if they complain that trespass creates an "analytical mismatch" between a land owner's legal rights and his and others' normative interests in the use of land. 35 Last, Blackstone's unconsented-entry paradigm defines the rights trespass presumes backhandedly, in reference to wrongs by non-owners. It would be tedious to list all of the legitimate uses owners might make with their Hohfeldian liberty to determine the uses of their lots. It would be even more tedious to enumerate all the potential dutyholders obligated not to interfere with those uses-let alone all the activities by nonowners that might jeopardize those uses. It is far more economical to declare that owners of land hold an in rem claim-right to be free from unconsented entries. It is even more economical for tort to declare that right by focusing on the correlative in rem duty: Any non-owner commits a wrong if she enters an owner's close without his consent.
III. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Now, the unconsented-entry paradigm does not supply a direct rule for legal decision making. The paradigm declares the basic contours of the accountability relationship between an owner and others in relation to his land. In specific disputes, the test institutes a rebuttable normative presumption. The other four strategies by which tort implements property rights all respond to that presumption.
The second strategy is to use affirmative defenses to override the unconsentedentry test, when positive-law control is not likely to give owners and non-owners their due interests (respectively) in controlling and accessing land for beneficial uses. Assume that, in a recurring land-use dispute, one of the four responsibilities or provisos associated with labor-based property defeats the justification for control rights. Assume also that this dispute occurs relatively infrequently, but just often enough to deserve its own doctrine. In such conditions, it is reasonable to leave the prima facie case for trespass broad and encompassing, and then use affirmative defenses to winnow out the (relatively few) false positives caught in that case. If one takes tort's rights-protecting function as paramount, land owners' substantive property rights are not specified by the prima facie case for trespass in isolation; they are specified instead by the "interplay among [prima facie] rules" in and "positive defenses" 37 to trespass.
Let me illustrate with two representative defenses to trespass. The necessity privilege basically embodies and recognizes in law the moral necessity proviso attached to labor claims. 38 Of course, the owner's control rights and the necessitous entrant's liberty of access need to be harmonized. Necessity doctrine does so, and reasonably so. The privilege gives priority to the entry only if the entrant faces a bona fide threat to his selfpreservation, and the privilege lasts only as long as the threat. The privilege also requires the entrant to use the owner's property with reasonable care, and to hold the owner harmless for any damage caused by his temporary commandeering of the property. 39 Adverse possession supplies a complete defense to trespass when a defendant occupies a plaintiff's land adversely (i.e., with intent to appropriate it), exclusively, notoriously, and continuously for the applicable limitations period. 40 Many elements of adverse possession determine subsidiary legal details relatively remote from the doctrine's core justifications. On labor-based foundations, however, those justifications are to enforce the two responsibilities labor rights attach to ownership: to mark claims of ownership, and not to waste owned resources. If a title owner "neglects to assert his rights in the manner provided by law," he confuses the occupier and his neighbors, he confirms he is not using his land beneficially in any sense, and he must then "accept the result of his own folly and negligence." 41 Such a negligent title owner then legitimizes the adverse possessor's having a claim, marked by long and notorious occupancy, to own land "improved by his labor, and enriched by the 'sweat of his brow. '" 42 When necessity and adverse possession specify property rights, they also do so backhandedly. Adverse possession converts a wrong into a non-wrong; when completed, an adverse possession ceases to be a prima facie trespass and becomes a legitimate occupancy and use of land. Necessity doctrine illustrates even more powerfully. In Ploof v.
Putnam, Ploof, his family, and his boat all were injured when he tried to tie the boat to Putnam's dock during a storm and Putnam's servant pushed the boat away from the dock.
Logically, the most important question was whether the storm threatened Ploof and his family enough that they deserved a temporary power to commandeer the dock. One can confirm the same point by studying doctrinal elements not required in trespass. The tort most familiar to practitioners-negligence-has a harm element; trespass to land does not. 44 Trespass's rights-based character protects autonomy as means to secure underlying interests in laboring. In the absence of extenuating circumstances, even the mere entry onto land unduly threatens the secure use justifying owner control.
That is why it is "an elementary principle, that every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful entry, into the close of another, is a trespass." 45 Treatise writers also like to classify torts as strict, intentional, or fault-based. In practice, most trespasses are deliberate or the product of (careless) turn-a-blind-eye mistakes. Yet trespass litigation can settle which of two parties with designs on a lot has better possession or title. Even if a defendant trespasses innocently and carefully, his mere entry may threaten significant damage to the land or activities on it. It is far easier for an owner (or his insurer, or his creditors) to monitor whether entrants are on his land than whether they are on it carelessly or deliberately. By the same token, although trespass's strict character settles liability for accidents caused in the course of trespasses, trespass is not an "accident" tort. All torts declare and protect rights; trespass declares and secures rights of exclusive control over land. Trespass holds defendants "civilly liable for the consequences which directly flowed from their unauthorized" trespasses, 49 no matter how unforeseeable those consequences are, 50 because those consequences partially constitute the wrongs to owners' rights. So trespass determines liability for accidents, but only incidentally, in the course of securing rights.
Trespass's strictness makes it seem wrong or strange to many scholars. Readers who find trespass's strictness normatively unpersuasive should keep in mind that nothing 46 about trespass's conceptual structure requires it to be a strict tort. A political community could institute control rights narrower than the rights explained in Parts I and II, and use explicit fault-based scienter requirements to limit owners' rights under positive law. Other scholars may assume that strict torts are inconsistent with corrective justice. Not so. Pure strict liability is inconsistent with corrective justice, 51 but strict liability in trespass to land is neither pure strict liability nor inconsistent with corrective justice. Corrective justice requires rectification of wrongs to owners' legitimate substantive rights. Understood in proper context, corrective justice says nothing about the content of those substantive rights, it assumes that some logically-prior political morality has specified those rights, and it layers corrective duties over logically-prior substantive duties correlative to those rights.
As long the unconsented-entry paradigm fairly represents the situations in which a nonowner unjustly interferes with an owner's rightful exclusive control, the prima facie case for trespass embodies a moral relation of fault-even though that case lacks an express requirement of fault.
My use of "fault" here may prompt another objection: If "fault" is pliable enough to cover a careful, innocent, and mistaken trespass, my use of the term must be incoherent or idiosyncratic. This objection may hold trespass to expectations informed by negligence, which has an express "fault" requirement. If so, that reaction just goes to show that too many tort scholars confer on negligence an undeserved "imperialism," attributable to the fact that most reported torts cases sound in negligence. 52 The objection may also hold the greater degree than criminal law, tort specifies the content of substantive rights. As not only land torts but also speeding laws confirm, quite often, rights cannot be enjoyed unless they are clearly defined and marked. To get that clarity, both in property and in civil traffic law must sometimes prohibit conduct that is subjectively well-meaning but objectively beyond bright-line markers. In both fields, it is correspondingly reasonable to classify innocent violations of the objective duties in each field as "faulty."
Whether one agrees with this account normatively, trespass doctrine supplies powerful confirmation that judges do appreciate it conceptually. If one wanted to make trespass track criminal law-like conceptions of fault, the easiest way to do so would be to graft a subjective intent requirement onto the prima facie case for trespass. The and mistakenly believing the land is his own, 55 he causes property damage specifically intending not to do so, 56 or he trespasses mistakenly and the trespass enables a third party or an extraordinary natural force to damage the property. 57 In criminal law, the defendant in the first hypothetical is not culpable, and the defendants in the latter two hypotheticals are only minimally culpable. In the civil law, however, in all three hypotheticals the defendant is culpable. In each, the plaintiff deserved secure control over his land, the defendant upset that control, and the plaintiff's losses flow directly from the defendant's invasion of his control rights. No surprise, then, that in civil trespass judges "gut the traditional concept of intentional harm," 58 so that "intent" becomes indistinguishable from the voluntariness a person displays in the course of acting. 59 So even when trespass is recast to fit preconceptions about fault from commonsense usages or criminal law, judges recast the revisions-to keep trespass focused on protecting property rights.
V. HARM-BASED EXCEPTIONS TO RIGHTS-BASED TORTS
Similarly, tort scholars sometimes "wonder why trespass to land does not … have a harm requirement," especially seeing as trespass to chattels does. 60 A trespass to chattel may be defined as a direct interference with a plaintiff's possession of a chattel, in a manner that causes the plaintiff harm. 61 was damaged, that the owner was dispossessed of it, or that he lost its use for a significant duration. 62 Yet there is no compelling reason why trespass to land must be symmetrical to trespass to chattels-not for pure symmetry's sake, not to embody corrective justice, nor to make trespass to land more like criminal law or negligence. As the same scholars acknowledge, "each tort involves the violation of a norm that specifies how one must treat others in light of certain important interests." 63 These scholars do not consider why distinctions between different forms of trespass might reasonably accommodate salient differences between the likely uses and management of land and chattels.
Compare a paradigmatic trespass to land against what the Restatement (Second) of
Torts portrays as a paradigmatic non-trespass to a chattel-a dispute in which a child pulls on the ears of a dog that doesn't belong to her. 64 The dog, like most chattels, is movable; the land is not. 65 Land cannot be brought into common spaces like sidewalks or highways.
Dogs can-and then create obstacles or risks of accidents for others. Land cannot be moved easily out of the way of others' dangerous conduct; dogs can. 66 To accommodate the differences between ownership of the land and the dog, tort deploys a fourth strategy to approximate substantive property rights: Qualify prima facie rights-based torts, better to calibrate the autonomy embodied in the rights to encourage the pursuit of the substantive interests that autonomy is expected to serve. There are exceptions in both trespass to land and trespass to chattels, but the exceptions confirm the rules. There are rights-based trespass to chattels-for chattels that are immovable. If a company sells gas regulators for utility customers to install on gas pipes, tort and remedy doctrine will presume that the unconsented attachment of the regulator to the pipe creates the "harm" requisite for a property tort. Since the gas pipes are immovable, if there is any possibility that the regulators may cause explosions it is practically likely that only "sole control" gives the utility company an adequate "right of protecting itself from loss caused by interference." 67 And in trespass to land, sometimes doctrine qualifies the prima facie case for recurring land-use disputes. In early American law, hunters had easements to traverse private land as long as the land was not occupied, they did not remain on the land any longer than necessary to hunt, and they caused no property damage. 68 During the nineteenth century, courts and legislators instituted limitations on suits involving cattle trespasses. The limitations excused accidental and harmless trespasses by cattle-but not deliberate or property-damage-causing trespasses. 69 In the twentieth century, courts limited prima facie trespass causes of action for overflights; land owners could no longer sue for trespass at altitudes above the floors set for airflight by regulation, and they could sue beneath those floors only when overflights caused actual damage to their lots. 70 Each of these rules diminishes owners' control over their lots. In the right socioeconomic conditions, however, owners receive reciprocating advantages in the beneficial uses of others' land-for sustenance (hunters' rights), for pasturage (cattle), or for travel and commerce (by air). Still, in each of these qualifications the unconsented-entry paradigm helps focus the tradeoffs and limit the scope of any exception. It is practically reasonable to force owners to waive their claim-rights to blockade innocuous entries if they are simultaneously endowed with reciprocal liberties to enter others' lots to hunt for sustenance, to graze livestock, or to fly. These implied reciprocal bargains break down when trespasses generate actual property damage or (as in cattle cases) when non-owners trespass aggressively.
As do property-based affirmative defenses, harm-based intentional property torts implement property prescriptions backhandedly. In trespass to chattels doctrine, blackletter sources declare that owners hold an interest in the "inviolability" of chattels. 71 Such declarations make harmless contacts wrongful. That wrong-declaration entitles chattel owners to exercise legal self-help powers to recapture or protect those chattels. At the same time, because chattels doctrine requires proof of harm, harmless contacts are not legally wrongful so as to trigger trespass liability. That qualification subtly authorizes nonowners to clear others' chattels out of their own ways. Harm-based trespasses to land declare that non-owners have rights of access and use in relation to others' lots of land.
Like the defenses in Ploof, however, trespass doctrine does not directly declare that nonowners have usufructs; it gets to the same result by declaring that a non-owner commits no told the assistant manager that the crossing was complete, he "reacted by giggling and laughing."
The jury awarded the Jacques nominal damages of $1, no compensatory damages for property damage, and punitive damages of $100,000. The punitive-damage award was set aside by the trial court, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered the award reinstated. 75 To support punitive damages, the supreme court needed first to establish that the Jacques had a rights-based cause of action for Steenberg Homes's harmless trespass.
The court concluded that the Jacques were entitled to such an action because Steenberg question, and so would any argument grounded solely in dignity or autonomy. In laborbased terms, a responsible decision maker would need at least to consider whether, on facts like those presented in Jacque, the autonomy granted by the unconsented-entry test might not secure the normative interests that autonomy usually furthers-individual interests in labor, necessity, and sufficiency.
Labor-based norms would institute some starting presumption in favor of the Jacques' enjoying autonomy. Although the unconsented-entry paradigm operates as a metaphor, not as a declaration of policy, it does embody several property-related indirectconsequentialist presumptions. As in the tunnel example just discussed, the rights-based approach freed the Jacques from needing to insure against accidental property damage not caused by their own activities. Separately, the rights-based approach conserves and reinforces all the advantages that clear boundaries provide in a wide range of land-related transactions.
That said, the presumption for the rights-based approach is rebuttable, and the norms that structure legal property rights help identify the legal reasons that count as acceptable grounds for rebuttal. In labor-based terms, owner control deserves to be suspended if the non-owner is commandeering property to deal with a necessity. In Jacque, it was not Steenberg Homes's fault that the regular delivery route was blocked by snow. In addition, owner control should be overridden if the owner's use-claims seem far weaker than the entrant's. Hunters'-access defenses embody this limitation, by protecting the hunter when the owner is absent and the land suffers no damage. In Jacque, a harm-based approach could have recognized that the Jacques' stated grounds for refusing access were unfounded, and that Steenberg Homes was trying to complete a useful contract.
Nevertheless: If tort law construed necessity claims in too free-wheeling a fashion, or if it granted harm-based exceptions too often, it might undermine some of the indirectconsequentialist benefits property supplies. Ordinarily, labor-based property norms prescribe that legal decision makers ought not to balance against each other the intended land uses of one particular owner and another particular non-owner. Necessity lets nonowners plead their rights of self-preservation against owners' claims of control and exclusion-but trespass doctrine stops trespassers from arguing that their planned uses are likelier to improve their lives than the owner's current use is improving his. In Jacque, the Jacques were actually occupying their lots (like land-occupying owners immune from hunters' claims of access). They were also were "using" the field behind their home in some productive sense-even if only to enhance their aesthetic enjoyment of their home.
So even if the Jacques' stated grounds for refusing to grant a crossing license were mistaken, they were "using" the field beneficially enough that it would be reasonable to err on the side of protecting their and other owners' interests in control and use. Meanwhile, Steenberg Homes did not face a life-threatening or property-destroying necessity; it could have waited to deliver the home.
Separately, ordinarily, property law and policy protect owners against deliberate and/or malicious trespasses. The law secures owner control and use by deterring and condemning deliberate or turn-a-blind-eye attempts to sabotage either. Steenberg Homes precipitated the confrontation; the Jacques had made clear before the day of the confrontation that they did not want to license a crossing and the company tried to move To be clear, the Wisconsin Supreme Court could have used necessity precedents or harm-based trespass precedents without undermining a labor-based approach. But holdings like these would have strained such an approach. The policies made salient in a labor-based approach create a presumption for rights-based trespass. Those policies identify legitimate reasons for departing from that presumption. They institutionalize general trade-offs between the presumption and the departures. These are the means by which a substantive morality rights supplies a foundation for legal reasoning in a close tort case. If tort scholars find the Jacque court's concern for property extreme, they would do well to consider that most moralities that justify trespass doctrine as it exists in legal practice show more concern for the integrity of exclusive control than one would get from, say, the all-the-circumstances-reasonableness analysis typical in negligence. 80 In any case, these disagreements are normative, not conceptual; different normative approaches could have been implemented using necessity or harm-based trespass. 
VII. MAKING ACCIDENT TORTS COMPLEMENT RIGHTS-BASED TORTS

A. The Relation Between Accident Torts and Trespass
Thus far, we have focused primarily on how moral opinions about property inform trespass and its defenses. These doctrines focus on the act-situations most likely (or so labor-based morality used to assume) to threaten owners' moral rights to the secure control over and use of their land. Yet many other act-situations may threaten those same rights incidentally. Which takes us to the last main strategy by which tort implements and specifies property rights: to make sure that accident-based torts specify and secure substantive rights consistently with the policies declared and enforced in the relevant rights-based torts.
In land-use disputes, this strategy is implemented not only in one subject-specific tort (nuisance) but also in the two backstop torts, negligence and strict liability. All three fields qualify the unconsented-entry paradigm to achieve the same goal as harm-based trespass doctrine. As one nuisance case explained, such qualifications are "as much for the advantage of one owner as of another; for the very [harm to property] the one complains of, as the result of the ordinary use of his neighbour's land, he himself will create in the ordinary use of his own." 81 To demonstrate this suggestion fully, one would need to study nuisance, 82 land-based strict liability, 83 and negligence comprehensively. For reasons of space and focus, I will focus here only on negligence, which probably seems to most readers the doctrine most inconsistent with my claims thus far.
B. Harm and Property in Negligence
Negligence seems to confound my hypothesis that property torts are protective.
Trespass is a strict and rights-based tort, but a land owner who suffers property damage not caused by a trespass must prove actual harm 84 and the defendant's negligence. 85 Trespass strongly presumes that the victims of ongoing encroachments deserve protection by injunctions. 86 If a land owner is exposed to a negligently-caused risk of accident, by contrast, it is strongly presumed that he may not sue until he suffers actual property neighborhood, all local owners' use interests are enlarged if they are all required to sacrifice the power to get prophylactic injunctive protection against any possible property damage. As one leading nuisance case explained:
[I]n a case of conflicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without in some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use of property, the law must make the best arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a view to preserving to each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the circumstances. 87 In this and other similar cases, courts rely on property-based norms to specify and limit the remedies available to plaintiffs with prima facie nuisance claims. To implement the same substantive property prescriptions in negligence, 88 tort institutes a harm requirement and the law of remedies institutes a general presumption against prophylactic injunctive relief.
89
Some readers may find it incoherent or damning for a theory of moral rights to limit positive-law rights to accommodate "broad considerations of public welfare" or "courts' institutional capacities and constraints." 90 This is a normative argument, not a conceptual one, but it is a weak argument. Respectable contemporary political theorists find it "irrational, crazy," to suggest that a moral theory could justify a claim that we have certain rights without considering the consequences the existence of such rights would entail. 91 As Part I explained, labor-based morality certainly permits and encourages indirectconsequentialist reasoning how best to secure rights. Now, labor-based morality reconciles labor-based rights to a relatively focused understanding of public welfare-to all citizens' enjoying "the largest measure of liberty possible in the circumstances." Even so, it does manage coherently to specify and protect rights while considering "public"
consequences.
Separately, some readers may believe that negligence gives negligent tortfeasors an entitlement to pollute. 92 This view makes a conceptual mistake, for it "completely misrepresents the normative guidance" of negligence. 93 In a land-use dispute, even if the defendant's primary activity was otherwise morally legitimate, a judgment of negligence declares that he commits a wrong by having managed carelessly a risk of accident that caused a neighbor actual damage. Negligence refrains from awarding prophylactic protection or stronger damages to facilitate the free exercise of property rights. Since the defendant is condemned "negligent," however, it would be a mistake to construe that qualification as a permission or approval to inflict the damage that triggers the judgment.
C. Duty and Property in Negligence
As Parts IV and V showed, trespass's prima facie elements are parasitic on logicallyprior substantive property rights. The same parasitic relation applies in negligence as well.
To be sure, negligence doctrine makes the parasitic relationship harder to see. Negligence encourages legal decision makers to consider individualized factors too numerous to consider in detail here. Before decision makers apply negligence principles to all these individualized considerations, however, they must put the considerations in context within 92 As trespass law can vary between rights-and harm-based models, so negligence can also vary the duty it imposes on land owners. In labor-based terms, tort doctrine may enhance owners' likely intended uses of their lots if it precommits them to take reasonable care to protect guests helping them accomplish some shared goal. It is also reasonable to strengthen owners' duties of care in proportion to their common interests with their guests. These are the judgments implemented (roughly) by the licensee and invitee categories. 97 Readers may doubt whether my account of the property/tort interface does as well explaining the modern approach to premises liability as it does the traditional approach.
Three-tier traditional premises liability has been repudiated in many situations, especially
as it applies to apartments in urban areas. 98 Yet my conceptual insights do not stand or fall with the labor-based approach. I have focused here on Buch and traditional premises liability because the property norms they assume and apply make it relatively easy to track the interplay between the property and tort in negligence. But judges with different property priors could use negligence to implement different substantive property interests.
For example, although Rawls's two principles of justice almost certainly do not require any single approach toward property rights, one could interpret a system applying traditional principles of trespass and modern premises liability as the product of a Rawlsian compromise. Trespass might reasonably be viewed as implementing Rawls's first principle. Trespass gives all owners, no matter how well or poorly advantaged, wide autonomy and privacy consistent with others' enjoying the same. In most premisesliability disputes, however, the defendant owner (a landlord) is usually more advantaged than the plaintiff (a tenant, or a guest of a tenant). So modern premises liability might reasonably be viewed as implementing Rawls's second principle, in a repeat act-situation in which the least-advantaged is likely to be the plaintiff and the better-advantaged the defendant. 99 Such a reconciliation of trespass and premises liability is normative, not conceptual-but it could be implemented in tort consistent with my conceptual account. In property terms, perhaps tenants' proprietary leasehold rights and guests' rights of access cannot be enjoyed meaningfully without landlords' owing stronger responsibilities than required at traditional common law to keep apartment buildings reasonably safe. The duty element in negligence provides the focal point where tort implements the stronger conceptions of proprietary responsibilities (on owners). In doing so, the doctrine backhandedly declares that tenants deserve stronger (respectively) proprietary leasehold rights, and that tenant guests deserve stronger non-proprietary interests in using apartments free from dangerous conditions. It is harder to reconcile the property rights an apartment owner holds under traditional trespass and modern premises liability than it is the rights of owners in trespass and under Buch. But the difficulty stems in part from the fact that Rawls's principles of justice do not apply very determinately to premises liability, and in part from the fact that traditional trespass and modern premises liability work at cross purposes. Hard cases strain the limits of conceptual analysis. In recent philosophical tort scholarship, this interplay has been noticed, but it has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that my study here of land-use torts confirms
and clarifies in what precise respects the law of torts protects rights and corrects wrongs.
In particular, I hope that this study has clarified how tort law declares and implements moral prescriptions about rights. Tort's corrective functions are written in the basic prohibitions written into torts; its protective functions need to be reverse-engineered from the implications of many related torts and defenses. But tort scholars mustn't make same mistake as the car driver who loses his keys on the dark side of a parking lot but looks for them on the side where the light is.
Claeys, "On the 'Property' and 'Tort' in Trespass" Draft of April 24, 2013
40
Finally, although my intended contributions are descriptive and conceptual, I hope I have at least suggested why it might be reasonable for tort to protect rights by correcting wrongs. Wrong-correction is certainly not a logical way to protect rights. Yet perhaps selfinterest gives most citizens the proper incentives to assert their rights-to complain only when others wrongly interfere with their free exercise of their rights. Perhaps courts are better at resolving resource disputes with two parties at a time than they are resolving those disputes systematically. And perhaps most people reason better about particulars than they do about the fundamental opinions they assume and apply when they judge particulars. And if one or more of these three assumptions is reasonable, then what seems at first blush a convoluted process is actually a very elegant accommodation to some basic limitations on human coordination.
